An essay on the origin of language, based on modern researches, and especially on the works of M. Renan — Edition Insights

Farrar's Critical Engagement with Materialism

In the middle excerpts, Farrar directly challenges materialist conclusions drawn from theories of language origin. He lists a series of questions: 'Must we say, with Condillac, that “science is only a well-constructed language?” or with M. Destutt de Tracy, that “thought is sensation?”' These queries show Farrar testing the logical consequences of materialist premises. He singles out Horne Tooke's Diversions of Purley for sustained critique, noting that Tooke's etymology of 'truth' as a contraction of 'troweth' leads to the claim that 'there is no such thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting truth.' Farrar counters by citing a philologist who called Tooke's work a 'mere castle in the air,' and he quotes Mr. Garnett's remark that 'the Delphian EI supported the tripod of truth; we fear that Tooke's if imperative led him into a labyrinth of error.'

The Role of Renan and Other Authorities

Farrar repeatedly acknowledges his debt to Renan, calling his treatises 'very clear, learned, and beautiful.' He also draws on Grimm and other German philologists. However, the excerpts show that Farrar does not simply summarize; he uses these authorities to build a case against reductive views of language. For instance, he notes that Tooke's system was 'overthrown' by Mr. Garnett's article on English Lexicography, which demonstrated that Tooke's analysis of particles 'may be contested more often than admitted.' Farrar's method is to present competing arguments, then weigh them through cited scholarship. This approach makes the essay a dialogue between materialist and idealist positions, with Renan serving as a touchstone for the latter.

Structure and Argumentative Strategy

The essay's structure emerges from its preface and the sampled middle chapters. Farrar begins by framing his work as unpretentious and derivative, yet the excerpts reveal a clear argumentative arc: he moves from summarizing Renan's views to attacking materialist etymologies. The attack on Tooke is detailed, with Farrar listing specific etymological errors—such as the claim that 'if' is an imperative of 'to give'—and citing counter-evidence from cognate forms in other languages. This forensic approach suggests that the full essay likely alternates between exposition and refutation. Farrar also uses rhetorical questions to force readers to consider the implications of materialist theories, asking whether they lead to 'no eternal right or truth.'

Evidence from the Excerpts: Voice and Recurring Details

Farrar's voice is scholarly but engaged, marked by parenthetical exclamation points—as in 'courage to be the fear of death (!)'—and direct addresses to the reader. He frequently uses metaphors: Tooke's system is a 'baseless fabric' and a 'castle in the air.' The excerpts also show Farrar's habit of citing multiple authorities in quick succession, creating a dense web of references. A recurring detail is his attention to etymology as a battleground for larger philosophical claims. For example, he traces Tooke's argument that 'truth' is merely 'what one troweth' and then shows how this leads to relativism. Farrar's own position is implied rather than stated: he defends the possibility of eternal truth against etymological reductionism.

Readers approaching Farrar's essay should attend to his dual strategy: he presents himself as a humble expositor while mounting a vigorous critique of materialist philology. The excerpts suggest that the full work is best read as a polemic disguised as a summary. Pay close attention to how Farrar uses footnotes and quotations—he often expands or transposes them, so checking his sources may reveal his interpretive slant. The essay rewards those who follow his argumentative thread from Renan's idealism to the refutation of Tooke's etymologies.

There’s something touching about Farrar’s old essay, how gently he resisted the idea that words are just mechanical things. It makes me think of the quiet hours I spent once with that other, plainer volume, How to Use the Popular Science Library; History of Science; General Index — Reading Notes, where even an index felt like a door left slightly ajar.